Abstract. Deniable authentication is a technique that allows one party to send messages to another while the latter can not prove to a third party the fact of communication. In this paper, we first formalize a natural notion of deniable security and naturally extend the basic authenticator theorem by Bellare et al.
Introduction
Authentication is a communication process, in which a receiver is assured of the authenticity of the peer identity and the authenticity of the incoming messages. This property can be guaranteed by means of a signature. Since a secure signature is unforgeable and publicly verifiable, it in other words means undeniability. This undeniability is not always desirable. For example, when you do an Internet shopping, you do not want your shopping privacy to be transferred to a third party. In this paper, we will investigate techniques for achieving deniable authentication.
Related Work
Deniable authentication was first considered in [15] . Earlier concepts occurred in [12] . Since deniability essentially requires that whatever computable through interactions is computable by adversary himself, a natural tool to achieve it is zero knowledge [20] . However, it is known that under a general complexity assumption any black-box concurrent zero-knowledge has a round complexitỹ ω(log κ) [33, 26, 32] . This implies that the practical deniability from it is almost impossible as most of the applications require concurrency. To overcome this barrier, [18, 16, 17, 25, 30, 13] relaxed the concurrency with a locally timing constraint. However, timing constraint is not satisfiable as it artificially increases the delay. An alternative approach is to adopt a non-standard complexity assumption. Di Rainmondo et al. [14] , based on an assumption of plaintext awareness [3, 11] , showed that SKEME [27] is deniably secure. But the assumption is very strong. Another alternative is to adopt a common reference string (CRS) model. In this setting, efficient concurrent zero-knowledge does exist [10, 22] . Unfortunately, it has been pointed out in the literature (e.g., Pass [31] ) that deniability obtained in this way is not satisfiable as the simulator usually owns a secret of CRS while it is impossible to a real adversary. Similarly, an original random oracle [4] based solution is not satisfiable, either. Pass [31] defined a revised random oracle model (we call it an uncontrollable random oracle (uRO) model), which is different from the original one in that the output of the oracle is maintained by an uncontrollable third party (instead of a simulator) although the simulator can still view the input-output pair of each query. Deniability under this model is practical since whatever computable by the simulator is computable by the adversary himself. However, authentication is not a research concern in [31] . As a summary, known research in deniable authentication is still not very satisfiable.
Contribution
In this paper, we first present an authentication model [2, 6] with featuring a concurrent computation model [29] . Under this, we formalize a notion of deniable security and naturally extend the authenticator theorem in [2] to the setting of deniable computation. This extension is essentially achieved by deploying a universal composition technique. This strategy is of independent interest. Then we construct two provably deniable MT-authenticators: uncontrollable random oracle based and PKI based, both of which are 3-round only. We remark that these results do not contradict the barriers outlined before (e.g., large round complexity). Indeed, in the previous subsection we implicitly assume that a receiver does not own a secret while in PKI-based protocol a receiver does own a secret. This setup assumption is very popular in real applications (e.g., key exchange). It is known [31] that deniability is impossible in the CRS setting. However, since participants in our protocol have secrets, our simulator has no need to use the secret for CRS. In fact, the protocol initialization in our model is executed by a third party. Thus, the simulator has no way to access the secret for CRS. Finally, as our application, we obtain a key exchange protocols that is deniably UM-secure.
Model
Bellare et al. [2, 6] formalized two models for cryptographic protocols: unauthenticated-link model (UM) and authenticated-link model (AM). This model is very useful in a modular design of UMsecure protocols. On the other hand, a concurrent composition model (e.g., [29] ) is convenient in analysis of protocols. We now present UM/AM models with featuring [29] .
Assume P 1 , · · · , P n are n-parties. π is an arbitrary protocol. The execution of π is modeled as follows. Each party is regarded as a polynomial time interactive Turning machine. Initially, P i is invoked with input, identity and random input. Then he waits for an activation. P i can be activated by incoming messages from other parties and/or external input. Once activated, P i follows the specification of π by computing π(input, internal state, incoming message) =(new state, outgoing messages, output).
Initial internal state is the party's input, identity and random input. After each activation, the internal state is updated by a new state. Each activation could generate outgoing messages (to other parties). It may also generate a local output and label the sensitive part as 'secret'. Each P i could concurrently run many copies of π. A copy is called a session. Each session has a session ID. The only requirement for a session ID is its uniqueness in P i . The input for different activations of each session in P i might be different. It is generated by a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm Φ i . For the th activation of the jth session, the input is x ,j = Φ i ( , j, x i , hist), where x i is the initial input to Φ i and hist is the output history of all copies of π in P i . Note x ,j could be empty. In order of delivery (also for security), each message sent into the channel is assumed to contain (sender, sender session ID, receiver, receiver session ID). In addition, we implicitly assume that π has been ideally initialized by a function I : for r ← {0, 1} κ , I(r) = I(r) 0 , I(r) 1 , · · · , I(r) n , where κ is the security parameter, I(r) 0 is the public information known to all participants, and I(r) i is the secret key for P i .
Unauthenticated-link Model
Roughly speaking, the unauthenticated-link model is a model for the concurrent execution of a protocol where a malicious adversary presents. In this model, the scheduling of events is completely determined by adversary U. Such a scheduling consists of a sequence of activations to parties. He can activate any party P i with an arbitrary incoming message. He can also invoke P i to start a new session. In both cases, it is assumed that Φ i has already supplied the input (if any). He can also delete, block, modify and insert any message over the channel. Once a party completes an activation, the outgoing message and the local output (if any), except the parts labeled as 'secret', are available to U. U can corrupt a party at any time. When one party gets corrupted, all sessions' internal states and the secret key within this party are available to U. A special note 'corrupted' is appended to the output of this party. It will not produce an output any more. In addition, his future action is fully taken by U. U can also corrupt a particular session in P i . In this case, he obtains the current internal state for this session. A special note of corruption is appended to this session's output. Later, it will not produce an output any more. The future execution of this session is fully taken by U. We assume session corruption is possible only if the session has started. This reflects the practical concern where a session is attacked only if the attacker sees the session's activity.
Assume the protocol is initialized by a trusted third party T. Specifically, before the protocol starts, T takes s ← {0, 1} κ and executes the initialization function
. Then he provides I(s) i to party P i as his secret. The global public information is I(s) 0 . At the end of protocol execution, T outputs
The final output of a party is defined to be the concatenation of his output history from all sessions.
We use Adv π,U,Φ (x, r) to denote the output of U, and use UnAuth π,U ,Φ (x, r) i to denote the output of P i . UnAuth π,U,Φ (x, r) 0 denotes the output of T. Let
Let UnAuth π,U,Φ (x) be the random variable describing UnAuth π,U ,Φ (x, r). Our inclusion of the output of T in the global output is for defining deniable security later (See Section 2.3).
Authenticated-link Model
Authenticated-link model is similar to unauthenticated-link model, except that any outgoing message sent by an uncorrupted party (if not blocked) will be faithfully delivered.
Authentication Functionality
The following functionality (See Figure 1) is to formalize the authenticated channel. Unlike [8] , here we directly consider the multiple sessions of the functionality. has been sent toÂ but ( * , id) was not received before, send (receiv, id,Pi,Pj, m) toPj. In any case, mark id as 'answered'.
Fig. 1. Ideal functionalityF for authentication
This seems helpful to simplify the presentation. The action ofP i is defined as follows. Whenever upon input (send,P j , m), copy it to the input tape ofF; whenever receiving (receiv, id,P ,P i , m) fromF, directly output it. The procedure (in Figure 1 ) forP i to send m toP j is called a session forP i ,P j andF, respectively. We simply say aF-session. Assume an uncorrupted senderP i never sends a message m twice. This convention allows us to easily identify a replay attack. Thus, a session for an uncorrupted sender can be identified by m itself. A session inF or in a receiverP j can be identified by id (for simplicity, we assume id ← {0, 1} κ never repeats in this paper). However, when a partyP i is corrupted, our functionality allowsÂ, in the name ofP i , to send any m toP j (throughF). This reflects the concern when one party is adversarial, cryptographic authentication techniques can not prevent it from flooding a receiver. Further remarks follow. First, message exchanges betweenP andF are ideally secure and immediate (i.e., no adversary plays between). Second,Ã can have an arbitrary delay to return (c, id). This reflects the nature of an asynchronous network. c = 1 means the message m is not blocked. Third,Â can corrupt anyP i or a session in it. If a session is corrupted, the session state (i.e., input or output for this session) is provided toÂ and a note 'corrupted' is appended in his output. The future action is fully taken bŷ A. IfP i is corrupted, all the sessions in it are corrupted byÂ. In addition, the future action ofP i is taken byÂ. Especially,Â can representP i to send any message m (including a previously sent message) throughF to a partyP j .
Authenticated-Link model
We are now ready to present the authenticated-link model (AM). Let P 1 , · · · , P n be n parties for executing π. AM follows the order in UM, except messages are sent/received throughF and the adversarial behavior is restricted correspondingly. Formally, -When P i needs to send a message m to P j , it invokesP i in Figure 1 with input (send,P j , m) to do this. -All incoming messages for a party P j are received through reading the output ofP j . -Upon output (receiv, id,P i ,P j , m) ofP j , P j executes π with incoming message m.
The action of an adversary A is as follows.
• When P i invokesP i with input (send,P j , m), A plays the role ofÂ in Figure 1 to participate.
• When a session sid in P i is corrupted, it is assumed that all theF-sessions ofP i that send/receive messages for session sid are corrupted. As a result, A will receive the internal state of P i in π including states from theseF-sessions. Finally, a noted 'corrupted' appears in the output of session sid. Later it is no longer active. Its action will be fully taken by A.
• When a party P i is corrupted, all sessions in P i are corrupted. As a result, the secret key I(r) i and all internal states are available to A. The future action of P i is taken by A.
The protocol is initialized by a third party T. Specifically, before the protocol starts, T takes s ← {0, 1} κ and executes the initialization function
. Then he provides I(s) i to party P i . The global public information is I(s) 0 for all parties. In addition, T can execute an extra function I (s ) = {I (s ) i } n i=0 for s ← {0, 1} κ . Initially, I (s ) 0 and I(s) 0 will be provided to A. Later whenever P i is corrupted, I(s) i and I (s ) i will be provided to A. At the end of protocol execution, T outputs
Note our treatment for introducing the extra I (s ) is for defining deniable security (See Section 2.3), where I (s ) will be the initialization function for the protocol realizingF. As for UM, let
Analogous to UM, we can define the adversary output AdvF π,A,Φ,I (x, r), the output of T AuthF π,A,Φ,I (x, r) 0 , the output of party P i AuthF π,A,Φ,I (x, r) i , the global output AuthF π,A,Φ,I (x, r) and the corresponding random variable AuthF π,A,Φ,I (x). Note in the UM case, I is empty. Also since I is already implicitly included in π, there is no need to explicitly label it on the above variables.
Deniable Security
For a protocol π to be deniably secure, we essentially hope whatever computable by an attacker through interactions can be computed by himself alone. There are two factors to prevent a simulator from executing such a deniable computation. First, x could be unknown. However, if x is private, it is hard to see what type of deniability can be formalized. To simplify the problem, we only consider functionalities, where x is not a secret. For instance, in key exchange, x i is a request to carry out key exchange. One may wonder why not just define the security model such that the adversary additionally plays the role of Φ to supply protocol inputs. We stress that for some functionalities such as oblivious transfer and e-voting, the inputs are secret. Thus, the adversary is not allowed to know them unless the underlying party gets corrupted. The perfect version of security in a multi-party computation is formalized as an ideal process, where the parties hands their inputs to a trusted party who feeds back an output for each party by computing the functionality himself. Details can be found in the literature (e.g., [29] ). In our setting, input x is not a secret. It follows that this formulation can also be regarded as an ideal version of deniable security. Again following the multi-party tradition, the deniable security of a protocol π can be defined as requiring a ideal process simulator to simulate a real system such that the global output of the ideal process is indistinguishable to that in the real execution. However, the second problem comes. Recall that in π, each party P i receives a secret key I(r) i from the setup function I and an adversary is unable to access an uncorrupted I(r) i . Thus, in order to be deniable, a simulator should not be allowed to know uncorrupted I(r) i either. To do this, we let a third party T to take I(r) = {I(r) i } for r ← {0, 1} κ and provide I(r) 0 to ideal process simulator. Later, I(r) i is provided to the latter if and only if P i is corrupted. At the end of the simulation, T output I(r) 0 and all corrupted I(r) i . The global output in the ideal process is expanded with the output of T. If π is aF-hybrid protocol, then I used by T in the above is replaced I and I for an arbitrary given extra I .
Definition 1. Let π be a protocol with initialization function I for computing a functionality G. Let I be arbitrary extra initialization function (I is empty if π is a UM protocol). π is said to be deniably secure if for any feasible x, I and any PPT adversary O against π there exists a PPT adversary S against the ideal process such that
where the left side and right side are the global outputs of ideal process and real process (i.e., in AM or UM) respectively.
Deniable Authentication Theorem
Essentially, we wish to construct a protocol ρ to realizeF. Then for any protocol π in theFhybrid model (i.e., AM), we replaceF by ρ and hope the composed protocol (denoted by π ρ ) is secure. Bellare et al. [2] proposed a notion of MT-authenticator, which is a realization ofF in the UM. They confirmed the above result when ρ is a MT-authenticator. However, here we are mainly interested in finding a ρ that does not introduce undeniability. Original MT-authenticator does not guarantee this since their simulator initializes the MT-authenticator himself. In order to be deniable, a simulator should not be allowed to know the secret key of party in ρ unless he is corrupted. To achieve this, we introduce a third party T to generate and maintain parties' private keys. Especially, a simulator is allowed to access I(r) i if and only if party i is corrupted. This is what we have done in the authenticated-link model. We formalize this intuition into the following notion of deniable authentication.
Definition 2. Assume ρ is a protocol for computingF. Let π be any protocol in theF-hybrid model. Let I ρ be the initialization function for ρ. π ρ is said to be deniably authenticated if for any adversary U against π ρ and any x, there exists an adversary A against π such that
Since MT-authenticator in [2] provides an authenticated transformation for any AM protocol, a question is whether there exists a natural property for ρ such that as long as ρ satisfies it π ρ will be deniably authenticated for any π. In the following, we introduce a notion of deniable MTauthenticator. We show that given a deniable MT-authenticator ρ, for any π in theF-hybrid model, π ρ is deniably authenticated. We define this notion through two protocol games. These game are essentially borrowed from the notion of universal composition [8] although we do not need any result or background about it.
The first game is denoted by G 0 . AssumeP 1 , · · · ,P n is running ρ in the UM with a dummy adversary A 0 . Z is a PPT interactive Turing machine. Assume I(r) = {I(r) i } n i=0 is the initialization function for ρ. Initially, Z will receive the public information I(r) 0 . On the one hand, Z plays the role of Φ to supply inputs forP i . On the other hand, Z can supply A 0 with instructions obeying the UM rules at any time. These instructions include (1) starting a session at some P i or (2) activating a session with a specific incoming message or (3) corrupting a session or a party. Upon an instruction, A 0 executes it faithfully. In case of (1)(2), A 0 outputs the outgoing message (if any) generated by the activated session. In case of (3), A 0 outputs the collected information. Z can read the outputs from all parties including A 0 . At the end of the game (which is decided by Z), Z outputs a bit b . This completes the description of G 0 . Now we define the second game. Denote it by G 1 . AssumeP 1 , · · · ,P n is executingF with an adversary A 1 . A PPT machine Z is described as follows. Initially, a third party T ρ takes I(r) = {I(r)} n i=0 for r ← {0, 1} κ and provides I(r) 0 to both A 1 and Z. Later I(r) i is provided to A 0 ifP i is corrupted. The remaining description for Z (i.e., supplying inputs toP i and instructions to A 1 ) is exactly as in G 0 , except A 1 instead of A 0 will respond to these instructions. The action of A 1 is arbitrary, except that he follows the rules of ideal process in computingF (see Section 2.2). At the end of G 1 , Z generates a bit b . Now we are ready to define our notion of deniably secure MT-authenticator. 
is negligible.
Essentially, G b is placed in a black box. The task of Z is to guess which game is inside. We show if no Z can win significantly better than a trivial guess, then such a ρ gives arise to a deniable transformation for anyF-hybrid protocol.
Theorem 1. If ρ is a deniable MT-authenticator and π is a protocol in theF-hybrid model, then π ρ is deniably authenticated.
Before our actual proof, we first present the main idea. Essentially, A follows U, except the part in executingF, where A activates A 1 through a sequence of instructions. If the ideal process in executingF with A 1 is replaced with the real execution of ρ with A 0 , then A becomes identical to U. Thus, if (2) is violated, we can construct a PPT machine Z ρ to distinguish G 0 and G 1 as follows. Z ρ simulates {P i } in π and Φ, and also follows A, except that whenever he needs to simulate a message transmission, he does it through the challenge G b for b ← {0, 1}. Finally, Z ρ provides the simulated global output to a distinguisher and outputs whenever he does. If b = 1, the global output in the simulation of Z ρ is distributed as AuthF π,A,Φ,Iρ (x); otherwise, it is distributed as UnAuth π ρ ,U,Φ (x). As a result, violation of (2) implies a non-negligible advantage of Z ρ , contradicting the assumption of ρ. Now we start to implement the above idea.
Proof. Let U be against π ρ . Assume I(r) = {I(r) i } n i=0 and I ρ (r ) = {I ρ (r ) i } n i=0 be the initialization function for π and ρ respectively. With the above idea in mind, we first construct A against π in theF-hybrid model. a. A receives I(r) 0 , I ρ (r ) 0 respectively for π and ρ from T, invokes U with I(r) 0 and I ρ (r ) 0 . P i will receive I(r) i and I(r) 0 from T. In addition, A initializes A 1 with I ρ (r ) 0 . b. Whenever P i wishes to send m to P j , he plays the role ofP i (in Figure 1) to send (send,P j , m)
toF, who will take id ← {0, 1} κ and send (id,P i ,P j , m) to A. A then, in the role ofF, activates A 1 with (id,P i ,P j , m). After seeing any output by A 1 , forward it to U. c. Whenever U requests to deliver a message msg to P j , activate A 1 with this request. In turn, if A 1 generates any output msg , A provides it to U. (Remark: as the output of A 0 in such a query is to report the outgoing message from P j , the output A 1 is supposed to be a simulation of such a message.) If A 1 generates an outgoing message (c, id) toF, A sends (c, id) toF as his reply for the request of bit c.
d. Whenever U requests to see an output of party i, collect the output of P i in π (not including the parts labeled as 'secret') and provide it to U. Note since both A and U are not allowed to see the secret parts, this simulation is perfect. e. Whenever U asks to corrupt a session id in P i , corrupt the corresponding session in π and obtain the session state stat. In addition, he, the role of Z in G 1 , requests A 1 to corrupt all the sessions that sending messages from session id (Recall each message contains the sender session ID of π; See the protocol syntax in Section 2). As results, A 1 will output simulated internal states stat for all these sessions. A merges stat and stat to provide a complete session state st for session id of P i in π. Finally, A provides st to U. f. Whenever U asks to corrupt a party P i , corrupt P i in π to get I(r) i and then obtain the secret key I ρ (r) i (from T by requesting A 1 to corruptP i ). Obtain internal states for all sessions in P i through session corruption as in item (e). Finally, provide all the information to U.
Finally, A outputs whatever U does. We claim that A will satisfy (2). Otherwise, we construct a PPT machine Z ρ to distinguish G 0 /G 1 with a non-negligible advantage. To do this, we first show that the simulation of A can be completed by black-box access to the game G 1 . Indeed, we only need to check the black-box access restriction for A can be satisfied.
-In item (a), this will be violated when A initializes A 1 with I ρ (r ) 0 . However, since T already initializes A 1 with it, this operation is not required any more. -In item (b), the code exactly follows the description of G 1 . Thus, A only needs to feed input (send,P j , m) and read the output from A 1 . -In item (c), A only needs to feed the instruction "deliver message msg to P j " to A 1 . The remaining computation will be perfectly simulated in G 1 .
-Item (d)(e)(f) do not violate black-box restriction.
This revision does not change the global output of the simulation (i.e., AuthF π,A,Φ,Iρ (x)). On the other hand, when the black-box G 1 is replaced with G 0 , then the global output of the simulated game is distributed exactly as UnAuth π ρ ,U,Φ (x). Now we are ready to describe the code of Z ρ . Given black-box G b , auxiliary input x and I ρ (r ) 0 , he initializes {I(r) i } for π inF-hybrid mode, simulates {P i } faithfully, plays the role of Φ, and also follow the revised A with black-box access to G b . Finally, Z ρ provides the global output out of the simulated game to the distinguisher of equation (2) and outputs whatever he does. Note that if b = 0, then out is distributed according to the right hand of equation (2); the right hand of (2) otherwise. Thus, non-negligible advantage of the distinguisher implies non-negligible advantage of Z ρ , contradiction to assumption on ρ.
Corollary 1. Assume ρ is deniably MT-authenticator and π is deniably secure in theF-hybrid model, then π ρ is deniably secure in the UM.

Our Deniable MT-Authenticators
Uncontrollable Random Oracle Based Deniable MT-Authenticator
In this subsection, we will construct a deniable MT-authenticator from random oracle. Notice that the original random oracle [4] is completely controlled by a simulator. Especially, if an oracle query is issued by the simulator himself, he can first choose the output and then decide the query input.
This provides too much freedom to a simulator. As pointed out by Pass [31] , a solution obtained in this way is not deniable as a real attacker does not have this right at all. The random oracle we use here is defined by Pass. This object is maintained by an uncorruptible third party but all the input-output pairs are seen by the simulator. We call it Uncontrollable Random Oracle (uRO). Deniability makes sense in this model since whatever computable by a simulator is computable by an attacker himself. Now we describe our uRO based MT-authenticator. We call it uRO-Auth MT-authenticator. Assume P i wishes to send a message m to P j . Let T i be the public-key of a trapdoor permutation owned by party P i and D i be the trapdoor for T i . P i first sends m to P j . P j then takes r ← {0, 1} κ , computes and sends back m T i (r) H(r, P j , P i , m) to P i . Receiving m α β, P i computes r = D i (α). If r =⊥, it checks whether β = H(r , P j , P i , m). If yes, he computes and sends out m||γ to P j , where γ = H(r , P i , P j , m). If r =⊥ or β is not successfully verified, he does nothing. Upon receiving m γ, P j checks whether γ = H(r, P i , P j , m). If yes, he generates a local output "(receiv, id, P i , P j , m)" for id ← {0, 1} κ ; otherwise, it does nothing. The graphic interpretation of the protocol is presented in Figure 2 .
Pi Pj
In the following, we show that uRO-Auth is a deniable MT-authenticator. We first outline the proof strategy, which is quite general and will be used throughout this paper. Assume we generally need to prove a protocol ρ is a deniable MT-authenticator. Then we need to construct a simulator A 1 such that Definition 3 is satisfied. On the one hand, we let A 1 participate in the ideal process forF. On the other hand, A 1 simulates P 1 , · · · , P n to execute ρ, where the adversarial behaviors are described by the instructions from Z. A 1 uses the simulated ρ to help compute c (requested bŷ F in the ideal process). The simulation is so good such that the global outputs in the real ρ and in the ideal process ofF are indistinguishable. As Z only read the output of G b (b = 0, 1), he only has a negligible advantage in distinguishing G 0 /G 1 .
Theorem 2. If H is an uRO, then uRO-Auth is a deniable MT-authenticator.
Proof. Keep the notations as in the definition of deniable MT-authenticator. We need to construct a simulator A 1 such that for any PPT machine Z
is negligible. I 1 Whenever A 1 receives a message (id,P i ,P j , m) (fromF) and is asked for a bit c, he internally simulates P i to send a flow one message m to P j in his simulated uRO-Auth and reports this flow one message to Z (intuitively, let Z believe he is interacting with real execution of uRO-Auth). I 1 Whenever A 1 was requested to start a session in the name of corrupted P i to authenticate a message m to P j , A 1 first in the name of corruptedP i sends (send,P j , m) toF. The remaining action of this query is to follow item I 1 . I 2 Whenever Z requests A 1 to deliver a message msg from P i to a responder P j (i.e., P j plays the authentication receiver in the protocol), A 1 does the following. A 1 represents P j to do so honestly in the simulation of uRO-Auth. If msg is a flow one message, he reports the simulated flow two message back to Z; otherwise, msg is flow three message. In this case, if the simulated P j accepts, c = 1; c = 0 otherwise. Feedback (c, id) toF, where if some (id,P i ,P j , m) was received fromF but ( * , id) has not been feedback, take id as in this received tuple; otherwise id ← {0, 1} κ . In any case, if c = 1, A 1 simulates P j to generate an output (receiv, id, P i , P j , m). Denote the event that c = 1 but (id,P i ,P j , m) was never received before by Bad 0 ; denote the eventP i is uncorrupted and c = 1 but (c * , * ) on m for a bit c * was sent toF by Bad 1 . Note under ¬Bad 0 ∧ ¬Bad 1 , outputs of P j andP j are identical. I 3 Whenever A 1 is asked to deliver a Flow2 message m||α||β to P i , A 1 checks whether L H has a record ((r , P j , P i , m), β) for some r such that α = T i (r ). If the check fails, it terminates this session; otherwise (in this case r is unique since T i is a permutation), asks H-oracle for query (r , P i , P j , m). Assume the answer is γ. He then simulates to send out m||γ to P j and reports this message to Z. This simulation is perfect except when β happens to be valid while (r , P i , P j , m) satisfying α = T i (r ) was not queried to H-oracle (this covers the attack by forging flow two message without query (r , P i , P j , m) to H-oracle). We note this event by E 1 . We know that the number of Flow2 message is upper bounded by run time of Z (denoted by R z ). Then,
Whenever A 1 is requested to reveal a session in P t , A 1 represents P t to do so honestly. No matter P t is a sender or receiver of m, we have that before Flow2 message the session state of P t is m while after Flow2 message the session state of P t is m||r Note the above session state is well defined if event ¬E 1 holds. A 1 then reports the collected session state back to Z. I 5 When A 1 is requested to corrupt P t , he first obtains D t from T, then combines all the internal states in sessions in P t . Finally report them to Z. This simulation is perfect under event ¬E 1 .
From the above simulation, under ¬Bad 0 ∧¬Bad 1 , the outputs of P i andP i are exactly identical. In addition, the simulation of A 1 differs from the real execution of uRO-Auth only if E 1 occurs. Thus, under ¬Bad 0 ∧ ¬Bad 1 ∧ ¬E 1 , the view of Z is identical to when interacting with G 0 . So it remains to show that Pr[Bad 0 ∨ Bad 1 ∨ E 1 ] is negligible. First, Bad 0 occurs if uncorrupted P j successfully verifies a flow three message (m, γ) and thus attempts to feedback a bit (c, id) to F but he never received a (id,P i ,P j , m) from the latter. Bad 1 implies two uncorrupted sessions accepts m. Since no uncorrupted sender sends the same m twice, at lest one session has no sender session. Thus, Bad 1 occurs only if r taken in these two receiver sessions happen to be identical or otherwise if (r, P i , P j , m, γ) with different r are consistent for both sessions (which has a probability R 2 z 2 κ , as for at least one session (r, P i , P j , m) was not queried to H-oracle prior to receipt of γ). This gives Consider a trapdoor permutation adversary I who takes ← {1, · · · , n}. Upon receiving the challenge trapdoor public-key T and a permutation challenge W , he runs Z and plays the code of F and A 1 interacting with it, except that T is defined to be T. Note the number of the receiver sessions is bounded by R z . I takes L ← {1, · · · , R z }, hoping that Bad 0 will occur to the Lth receiver session. The simulation code of I is to play the roles of A 1 andF, except the followings. a. Whenever seeing that a query (r, P a , P b , * ) for any a, b is sent to H-oracle, I first checks whether T (r) = W . If yes, it succeeds and terminates; otherwise, it does nothing. b. when I is requested to activate the Lth receiver session (say at party P v ) with incoming message m * , I checks whether the sender implied in m * is the owner of T . If yes, it takes β * ← {0, 1} κ and simulates to send m * ||W ||β * to P and reports this message to Z; otherwise, he aborts (this implies that the choice of ( , L) is wrong). c. when Z requests to corrupt P , or reveal the Lth receiver session or its corresponding sender session, I is unable to provide D z for the first case and is unable to provide the state r for the remaining two cases. He aborts the simulation. Note since Bad 0 never happens to a corrupted sender or revealed session, this abortion event implies the guess of ( , L) is wrong. d. when I is requested to deliver a Flow2 message m ||W ||β to P j , item (a) guarantees that (D (W ), P a , P b , * ) was not queried to H-oracle. If m = m * and β = β * , then I takes γ * ← {0, 1} κ and simulates to send out m * γ * to P v and reports this message to Z. Otherwise, P simply rejects and terminates this session. Note the wrong reject implies a E 1 event. Thus, under event ¬E 1 , the simulation is perfect. e. when the Lth receiver session (in party P v ) is activated with m * |γ later, I checks if there is any ((r, 
too. This concludes our proof.
PKI-based Deniable MT-Authenticator
PKI-based deniability is rarely studied in the literature. However, deniability in this case is very important as lots of protocols (e.g. key exchange) are built under PKI. In this subsection, we will construct a deniable MT-Authenticator based on PKI. An immediate idea is to directly use ring signatures [34] . However, this solution is not fully deniable as one can conclude one of ring members signed the message. In the following, we introduce our new construction.
Let (Gen(1 κ ), E, D) be a public-key encryption system, where Gen(1 κ ) is the key generation algorithm for encryption/decrpytion key pair (ek, dk) and E/D are encryption/decryption algorithms. Let (G (1 κ ) , RS, RV ) be a ring signature scheme, where G(1 κ ) is the signing/public key pair (sk, vk) and S/V are signing/verification algorithms. For a user P i , the PKI authority takes (ek i , dk i ) ← Gen(1 κ ), (sk i , vk i ) ← G(1 κ ) . The cerificate for P i is the authority's digital signature on (ed i , vk i ). Let the global public-key
. Each user will receive his private key (sk i , dk i ). For simplicity, we use E j to represent the encryption using ek j . When the ring of two users P i and P j is clear, we use RS i () to represent the signing process with key sk i and simply use RV ij () to represent the verification algorithm for the ring P i and P j . In addition, assume P ij is a non-interactive zero knowledge protocol for relation
is an encryption of x using randomness y. We also use P to denote such a protocol where P i and P j are unspecified. We use P ij {E i (k; u) E j (k; u ); k u u } to denote a random proof for an input (E i (k; u), E j (k; u )). Our PKI-Auth MT-authenticator is as follows.
Pi Pj 
In addition, P j defines the internal state to be (a, b, P i , P j , m) and erases other intermediate data. 3 . P i verifies whether σ is valid, decrypts k from E i (k; u) and checks whether RV ij ((a, b, P j , P i , m, 0), k) = 1. Next, he takes v, v ← {0, 1} κ , computes and sends In the following, we show that our PKI-Auth protocol is a deniable MT-authenticator against a non-adaptive adversary. To do this, we need P to be an adaptive non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for relation R, where 'adaptive' means the system parameter is chosen before the common input to be proven is chosen; See [28] . The proof of Theorem is put in appendix.
Theorem 3. Assume P is an adaptive non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for relation R with negligible soundness error. (Gen(1 κ ), E, D) is a CCA2 secure public-key encryption scheme, and (RS, V K) is an existentially unforgeable ring signature scheme. Then PKI-Auth is a deniable MTauthenticator against non-adaptive adversary.
Application to Deniable Key Exchange
Key exchange is a communication procedure in which participants establish a temporarily shared secret key. To evaluate the security, several models are proposed in the literature [2, 4, 6] . Here we use the model in [24] , a slightly revised version of [2] . In this model, an ideal process is defined. Then a real protocol λ is constructed. λ is said to be secure if for any adversary against λ, there exists an adversary against the ideal process such that the global output in these two worlds are indistinguishable. Here the ideal process as well as the security definition should be slightly modified to be consistent with that in Section 2.3. In [24] , a F-hybrid secure key exchange protocol Encr-KE was proposed (See Figure 4) , where (G (1 κ ), E,D) is a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme. Notice that this protocol has an empty initialization function. It follows that Encr-KE is deniably secure in the F-hybrid model in the sense of Definition 1 (note the original proof needs to be slightly modified in order to cater our formalization of authenticated-link model).
Pi Pj
state={k}, erase other data Fig. 4 . AM-secure Key Exchange Protocol Encr-KE, Details see [24] Denote the key exchange protocol obtained by applying uRO-Auth and PKI-Auth to Encr-KE by uROE-KE and PKIE-KE, respectively. From the deniable authicator theorem, we have if (a, b, P i , P j , m, 1, γ 1 γ 2 ) ∈ L and if γ 1 γ 2 ω is consistent, where a b is taken from the internal state of P j . In case of yes, he sets Flag=1; otherwise, Flag=0. In any case, if ∃ a message (id,P i ,P j , m) was received fromF for some id but ( * , id) has not been feedback, he sends a message (Flag, id) back toF. If Flag = 1, simulate P j to generate output (receiv, id, P i , P j , m) where id is taken as in the (Flag, id) message (w.r.t. m) toF if happens; id ← {0, 1} κ otherwise. Denote Bad 0 the event Flag = 1 but A 1 never received ( * ,P i ,P j , m) fromF. Note by item I 1 , this happens only when P i is uncorrupted. Denote Bad 1 the event P i is uncorrupted and Flag = 1 but (1, id) w.r.t. m was feedback toF before. Note Bad 0 implies P j will not output m but the simulated P j does it; Bad 1 implies the simulated P j outputs m twice butP j only outputs it once. I 5 . Whenever A is requested to reveal a session state in P t , he reports the partial or whole vector of (a, b, m, P i , P j ) to Z.
Denote Γ 0 the simulated execution of PKI-Auth by A 1 . Consider a mental variant Γ 1 of Γ 0 , where the difference is that in the case of P j ∈ C at I 2 or I 3 , all the records to L are real (i.e., k = RS i (a, b, P j , P i , m, 0) for records from the former case and w = RS i (a, b, P i , P j , m, 1) for records from the latter case). Let Γ 2 denote the execution of PKI-Auth in the real world. Then Γ 2 and Γ 1 is identically distributed, except Case 1: In the case P j ∈ C at I 3 or P i ∈ C at I 4 , where the verifications in Γ 1 are successful but verifications fail in Γ 2 . This happens only when c 1 and c 2 at I 3 (or γ 1 and γ 2 at I 4 ) decrypts to different plaintexts. Denote this event of inconsistent ciphertexts in a game Γ l by E 1 (Γ l ), l = 0, 1, 2. Then E 1 (Γ l ) happens only if P ij in Γ l has a soundness error. Let the runtime of Z be bounded by R z . Then Pr[E 1 (Γ l )] ≤ R z 1 . Case 2:
In case of P j ∈ C at I 3 , (a, b, P j , P i , m, 0, c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ L but for D i (c 1 ) = k it holds that V ((a, b, P j , P i , m, 0), k) = 1 and that c 1 |c 2 |σ is consistent. Similarly, in case of P i ∈ C at I 4 , (a, b, P i , P j , m, 1, γ 1 , γ 2 ) ∈ L but for D j (γ 2 ) = z it holds that V vk ((a, b, P i , P j , m, 1, z) = 1 and that γ 1 |γ 2 |ω is consistent. Denote either of these events in Game Γ l (l=0, 1) by E 2 (Γ l ). We have that in these events it must hold that c 1 |c 2 (resp. γ 1 |γ 2 ) encrypts an identical message k (resp. z); otherwise, one can reduce to break the soundness of P. In the following, we always assume the soundness of P holds. Upon an event E 2 (Γ l ), if (a, b, P j , P i , m, 0,c 1 ,c 2 ) ∈ L in case of the former or (a, b, P i , P j , m, 1,γ 1 ,γ 2 ) ∈ L in case of the latter, then such an event happens with negligible probability; otherwise, one can reduce to break the non-malleability of E (Recall that E is CCA2 secure and that CCA2-security is equivalent to non-malleability under CCA2 attack; See [21, 15] ). Details are omitted. We now consider the case (a, b, P j , P i , m, 0, * , * ) ∈ L (resp. (a, b, P i , P j , m, 1, * , * ) ∈ L). Note that for any uncorrupted pair P i and P j , all the valid ring signatures in Game Γ 1 (or Γ 0 if any) generated by simulator must have been recorded in L. Thus, unrecorded valid signature implies a forgery of ring signature for pair P i and P j . Denote the forgery of ring signature for an attacker with runtime R z by 2 . Then we have Pr[E 2 (Γ l )] ≤ n 2 2 , for l = 0, 1.
Consider the gap between Γ 1 and Γ 0 . Since the only difference between them is whether records in L are real or not, a simple Left-Right reduction for encryption allows us to reduce to the 2-user encryption left-right reduction 1 , which in turn reduces to the semantical security of E in the multiuser setting (this again is equivalent to the semantic security of a single user; See Theorem 4.1 in [1] ). Thus, the global outputs in Γ 1 and Γ 0 are indistinguishable.
Therefore, the global output of Γ 0 and Γ 2 are indistinguishable. To conclude the proof, we only need to guarantee that Pr[Bad 0 ∨ Bad 1 ] is negligible. First of all, Bad 0 does not happen since Flag = 1 implies the sender session P j was started. Recall the successful verification of the record at I 4 implies that P i indeed processed Flow2 in order to send message m to P j . By item I 1 , only afterP i sends (send,P j , m) toF, can A 1 be invoked to simulate P j (by the message (id, * ) from F). Bad 1 occurs only if Flag=1 at I 4 holds while A 1 previously sent a message (1, id) toF. This event implies that b repeats in P j . Thus, it occurs with probability at most 1 Toward this reduction, we need to run the simulator of P. We remark that the NIZK simulator here is only used to prove the gap between Γ1 and Γ0 is negligible. Our real simulator A1 in Γ0 does not use this simulator thus does not break the deniability restriction. The game simulated by the left-right attacker is indistinguishable from Γ0 (resp. Γ1); otherwise, zero knowledge property of P is broken.
